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Reasoning About Coalitional Effectivity
in Modal Extension of  Lukasiewicz Logic
Toma´sˇ Kroupa1 and Bruno Teheux2
 Lukasiewicz logic
Replace the {0, 1}-valued judgements with the quantitative assessment of proposi-
tions φ in the scale Łk =
{
0, 1k, . . . ,
k−1
k , 1
}
, k ∈ N. The logical connectives are:
negation ¬x 1− x
strong disjunction x⊕ y min{x + y, 1}
strong conjunction x y max{x + y − 1, 0}
implication x→ y min{1− x + y, 1}
lattice disjunction x ∨ y max{x, y}
lattice conjunction x ∧ y min{x, y}
Many-valued effectivity functions
N = {1, . . . , n} player set Σi finite strategy space of player i ∈ N
S finite set of states o :
∏
i∈N Σi→ S outcome function
Definition
Let G = (N, {Σi | i ∈ N}, S, o) be a game form. The Łk-valued
effectivity function of G is the map EG : PN × ŁSk → Łk
defined by
EG(C, f ) = max
σC
min
σC
f (o(σCσC)), C ∈ PN, f ∈ ŁSk .
Example
ui :
∏
j∈N Σj → Łk utility function of player i ∈ N
o(σ1, . . . , σn) = (ui(σ1, . . . , σn))i∈N ∈ ŁNk
S = ŁNk states
How to assess the utility of coalitions C ⊆ N?
Idea
Use an aggregation function fC : ŁNk → Łk. For example:
• fmC (x1, . . . , xn) = min{xi | i ∈ C}
• faC(x1, . . . , xn) =
1
n
∑
i∈N xi
Interpretation: EG(C, fC) is the minimum guaranteed utility that the coalition C is
able to ensure provided that the cooperative outcomes are evaluated by fC
Playable Łk-valued effectivity functions
An Łk-valued effectivity function is a mapping E : PN × ŁSk → Łk.
1. outcome monotonic: E(C, f ) ≥ E(C, g) for every C ∈ PN and f, g ∈ ŁSk , f ≥ g
2. idempotizable: E(C, f⊕f ) = E(C, f )⊕E(C, f ), E(C, ff ) = E(C, f )E(C, f )
for every C ∈ PN and every f ∈ ŁSk
3.N-maximal: ¬E(∅,¬f ) ≤ E(N, f ) for every f ∈ ŁSk
4. superadditive: E(C, f ) ∧ E(D, g) ≤ E(C ∪ D, f ∧ g) for every C,D ∈ PN with
C ∩D = ∅ and every f, g ∈ ŁSk
5. regular: E(C, f ) ≤ ¬E(C,¬f ) for every C ∈ PN and f ∈ ŁSk
6. coalition monotonic: E(C, f ) ≤ E(D, f ) for every C ⊆ D ∈ PN and every f ∈ ŁSk
Definition
We say that E : PN × ŁSk → Łk is playable if E(C, 1) = 1,
E(C, 0) = 0, and the conditions 1.-4. are satisfied.
Theorem
An Łk-valued effectivity function E is playable iff
there is a game form G such that E = EG.
Language of many-valued coalitional logic
Let L be the language {→,¬, 1} ∪ {[C] | C ∈ PN}.
The set FormL of formulas is defined inductively from the countably infinite set of propo-
sitional variables Prop by the rules:
φ ::= 1 | p | φ→ φ | ¬φ | [C]φ p ∈ Prop, C ∈ PN
The formulas are essentially the same as the formulas in Pauly’s
Coalitional Logic, while the intended semantics is completely dif-
ferent: every φ ∈ FormL is evaluated in the non-boolean chain Łk.
Axioms of Łk-valued coalitional logic
•The axioms of  Lukasiewicz Łk-valued logic
•The axioms:
¬[C]0
[C]1
¬[∅]¬p→ [N ]p
([C]p ∧ [D]q)→ [C ∪D](p ∧ q)
[C](p p)↔ [C]p [C]p
[C](p⊕ p)↔ [C]p⊕ [C]p
for every C,D ∈ PN with C ∩D = ∅
•Closed under: MP, Equivalence, Uniform Substitution, Monotonicity
Definition
We define the Łk-valued coalitional logic Ck to be the inter-
section of all the Łk-valued logics satisfying the above axioms.
Generalized neighborhood semantics
An Łk-valued coalitional frame is a pair F = (S,E), where E : S → (PN×ŁSk → Łk)
assigns a playable effectivity function E(s) to every state s ∈ S.
Definition
An Łk-valued coalitional model is a pair M = (F,Val),
where F = (S,E) is an Łk-valued coalitional frame and Val is
a truth valuation S × Prop→ Łk.
We need to extend Val to modal formulas:
Val(s, [C]φ) = E(s)
(
C,Val(−, φ)), C ∈ PN, s ∈ S, φ ∈ FormL
Completeness
We use the technique of the canonical model to prove the following:
Theorem
Let φ ∈ FormL andM be an Łk-valued coalitional model. Then
Ck ` φ iff M |= φ.
Equivalent presentation of idempotizability
Let i ≤ k. The following are equivalent:
• the truth value of formula ‘coalition C can enforce a state in which φ holds ’ is ≥ ik
• coalition C can enforce a state in which the truth value of φ is ≥ ik
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G = (N, {Σi | i ∈ N},ŁN
k , o)
A many-valued modal logic with a neighbor-
hood semantics a` la Coalition Logic.
